

AT&T'S BID FOR TIME WARNER

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On October 22, 2016 AT&T announced an agreement to buy Time Warner for over \$85 billion. The agreement was met with surprise and a fair bit of skepticism. Only two years earlier in 2014, executives at Time Warner advised shareholders to reject an offer of \$89 billion from 21st Century Fox as undervaluing the organic growth prospects of the company. Furthermore, AT&T was already highly leveraged. In 2015, AT&T acquired DirectTV for \$48.5 billion in cash and stock – a deal that AT&T was still digesting. There were also concerns as the disastrous merger of AOL and Time Warner was still fairly fresh (2009). The AT&T-Time Warner deal was still subject to regulatory approval, and although some had spoken out against the deal, regulators did approve a similar merger of Comcast and NBC Universal back in 2011. With these concerns about the price, strategic fit, debt load, and regulatory approval, many were skeptical of the deal's efficacy.

INTRODUCTION

On October 22, 2016 AT&T announced that executives at Time Warner had agreed to sell the company for \$85.4 billion. The deal came as somewhat of a surprise because of the fallout of 21st Century Fox's failed bid for Time Warner in 2014. Despite an initial offer of \$80 billion, and signals that it was willing to raise its offer to \$89 billion, executives at Time Warner advised shareholders that the deal undervalued the company and that they expected more from Time Warner's organic growth prospects. Executives and shareholders at Fox thought that Time Warner was asking too much, so Fox withdrew the deal shortly thereafter (Peers & Hagey, 2014). So, it came as somewhat of a surprise when two years later executives at Time Warner recommended the acceptance of an \$85 billion offer from AT&T.

AT&T

AT&T, formerly known as SBC Communications Inc. (SBC), became an independent publicly-traded telecommunications service provider in 1984 as a result of the anti-trust consent decree breaking up AT&T Corp. SBC was one of several regional holding companies providing local telephone service as a part of the holding company, AT&T Corp. In 1984, SBC mainly operated in five southwestern states. It expanded its operations through the years through a series


of mergers: Pacific Telesis Group (1997), Southern New England Telecommunications Corporation (1998), and Ameritech Corporation (1999) which expanded its coverage into 13 states. In 2005, SBC changed its name to AT&T Inc. and in 2006 it increased its landline coverage to 19 states after merging with BellSouth. More importantly, it gained BellSouth’s stake in AT&T Mobility (formerly Cingular Wireless). In 2015, AT&T acquired DirectTV, a major supplier of digital television entertainment in North and South America for \$48.5 billion (AT&T, 2015). The Time Warner deal would be AT&T’s biggest yet. As AT&T’s CEO, Randall Stephenson, observed “In this industry, if you can achieve scale, and manage scale and complexity, it’s a massive competitive advantage.” (Gryta, 2016) Stephenson went on to say, “A big customer pain point is paying for content once but not being able to access it on any device, anywhere. Our goal is to solve that.” (Knutson, 2016).

The company’s services and products were marketed under the AT&T, Cricket, DIRECTV, SKY, Iusacell, Unefon and Nextel Mexico brand names. The services and products offered included: wireless communications, data/broadband and Internet services, digital video services, local and long-distance telephone services, telecommunications equipment, managed networking, and wholesale services. See Table 1 (at the end of the case) for a breakdown of AT&T’s sales by its business reporting segments (AT&T, 2015).

EXHIBIT 1:

Growth in AT&T’s Debt and Equity

(Source: Mergent Online, 2017)



As some parts of the company grew so did its debt to cover the investments in expansion and acquisition. The Exhibit 1, shows that growth from 2007-2016. Detailed information can be found in AT&T’s consolidated financial statements as shown in Appendix A.

TIME WARNER

Time Warner was formed in 1990 through merger of Time Inc. and Warner Communications. It was the third largest TV content provider. In recent years, the company had positioned itself as a pure content provider including the spin-off of AOL, Time Warner Cable pay TV, and Time magazine (Time Warner, 2016). The company went through extensive restructuring, but still included much of former Warner's original assets including Warner Bros studios, the TBS, TNT, CNN, CW, and HBO networks, DC Comics, and a 10% stake in Hulu. Some analysts believed Time Warner's premium content brands made it the most attractive stand-alone media asset. The fact that it didn't have a controlling shareholder and its \$28 billion in revenue in 2015 made the company all the more attractive (Ramachandran, Mattioli, & Hagey, 2016). The financial statements for Time Warner may also be found in the Appendix.

The acquisition announcement placed a significant premium over the current trading value for Time Warner. As shown below in Exhibit 2, shares of Time Warner's stock rose considerably on the acquisition offer.

EXHIBIT 2:

Time Warner Increase Price

(Source: Mergent Online, 2017)



CONCLUSION

Bringing a content provider (entertainment) together with a distribution network had been tried before, most notably, AOL and Time Warner in 2001 and Comcast's acquisition of NBCUniversal. Some analysts argued that the 2011 Comcast/Universal deal had exhibited few synergies (Smith, 2016). Consumer groups were skeptical of AT&T's bid for Time Warner as well. Michael Copps,

former FCC Commissioner and advisor to Common Cause, was quoted as saying “Allowing a communications behemoth like AT&T to swallow the Time Warner media empire should be unthinkable.” (Eggerton, 2016) Indeed, the Justice Department had denied Comcast’s 2009 purchase of Time Warner Cable from Time Warner stating it would have concentrated too much power in an internet gatekeeper. In 2011, AT&T’s bid for T-Mobile was blocked also. AT&T countered that buying Time Warner was not monopolistic since they were buying a supplier (vertical, not horizontal integration) similar to the approved Comcast/Universal deal (Eggerton, 2016). The 2016 U.S. Presidential election also cast a shadow over the deal with both candidates expressing disapproval of the deal. On the campaign trail, Donald Trump stated “AT&T is buying Time Warner, and thus CNN, a deal we will not approve in my administration because it’s too much concentration of power in the hands of too few.” (Knutson, 2016)

The regulatory hurdles notwithstanding, there was still the question of the value of the deal. As of October 31, 2016 the shares of Time Warner were still trading below AT&T’s offer price, insinuating that the deal might not go through. And the deal offer of \$85 billion was significantly below 21st Century Fox’s \$89 billion bid two years ago. Did AT&T offer too much or did Time Warner accept too little?

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TABLE 1
AT&T Operating Segments

	Consolidated Operating Revenue (in billions of U.S. Dollars)		
	2016	2015	2014
Business Solutions Segment			
Wireless Service	\$31.85	\$30.69	\$30.18
Fixed Strategic Services	11.39	10.46	9.30
Legacy Voice and Data	16.36	18.47	20.23
Wireless equipment	7.78	7.95	7.04
Other	3.62	3.56	3.86
Entertainment Group Segment			
Video entertainment	36.45	20.27	6.83
High-speed internet	7.47	6.60	5.52
Legacy voice and data services	4.83	5.91	7.59
Other	2.53	2.51	2.29
Consumer Mobility Segment			
Wireless service	27.54	29.15	30.85
Equipment	5.66	5.92	5.92
International Segment			
Video entertainment	4.91	2.15	-
Wireless service	1.91	1.65	-
Equipment	0.47	0.30	-

Source: AT&T, 2016

APPENDIX A – Consolidated Financial Statements

Annual Income Statements (all number in millions)

	AT&T			Time Warner		
	12/31/16	12/31/15	12/31/14	12/31/16	12/31/15	12/31/14
Fiscal Year Ending						
Total Revenue	\$163,786	\$146,801	\$132,447	\$29,318	\$28,118	\$27,359
Costs of Goods Sold	<u>38,276</u>	<u>35,782</u>	<u>60,611</u>	<u>16,376</u>	<u>16,154</u>	<u>15,875</u>
Gross Profit	125,510	111,019	71,836	12,942	11,964	11,484
Indirect Operating Costs						
Selling General & Admin.	74,955	64,218	39,697	5,123	4,824	5,190
Depreciation & Amortization	25,847	22,016	18,273	190	189	202
Other Operating Expense	<u>361</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2,120</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>581</u>
Total Indirect Operating Costs	<u>101,163</u>	<u>86,234</u>	<u>60,090</u>	<u>5,473</u>	<u>5,098</u>	<u>5,973</u>
Operating Income	24,347	24,785	11,746	7,469	6,866	5,511
Non-Operating Income / Expenses						
Interest Income (Expense)	-4,910	-4,120	-3,613	-1,161	-1,163	-1,169
Other Non-Operating Income	<u>277</u>	<u>-52</u>	<u>1,652</u>	<u>-830</u>	<u>-134</u>	<u>490</u>
Total Non-Operating Income	<u>-4,633</u>	<u>-4,172</u>	<u>-1,961</u>	<u>-1,991</u>	<u>-1,297</u>	<u>-679</u>
Earnings Before Tax	19,714	20,613	9,785	5,478	5,569	4,832
Taxation	6,479	7,005	3,442	1,281	1,651	785
Minority Interests	357	342	294	-1	-1	0
Equity Earnings	98	79	175	-283	-123	-153
Discontinued Operations				11	37	-67
Net Income	<u>\$12,976</u>	<u>\$13,345</u>	<u>\$6,224</u>	<u>\$3,926</u>	<u>\$3,833</u>	<u>\$3,827</u>
Dividends Paid	(\$11,797)	(\$10,200)	(\$9,552)	(\$1,269)	(\$1,150)	(\$1,109)
Contribution to Retained Earnings	\$1,179	\$3,145	(\$3,328)	\$2,657	\$2,683	\$2,718
Number of Shares (Basic)	6,168	5,628	5,205	781	815	863
Earnings per Share (Basic)	\$2.10	\$2.37	\$1.19	\$5.01	\$4.69	\$4.42

Source: Morningstar Online, 2017.

Annual Balance Sheets (all number in millions)

Fiscal Year Ending	AT&T			Time Warner		
	12/31/16	12/31/15	12/31/14	3/31/16	3/31/15	3/31/14
<u>Assets</u>						
Cash & Equivalents	\$5,788	\$5,121	\$8,603	\$1,539	\$2,155	\$2,618
Short Term Investments	5,788	5,121	8,603	1,539	2,155	2,618
Accounts Receivable	16,794	16,532	14,527	8,699	7,411	7,720
Inventories				2,062	1,753	1,700
Prepaid Expenses	1,555	1,072	831			
<u>Other Current Assets</u>	<u>14,232</u>	<u>13,267</u>	<u>8,067</u>	<u>1,185</u>	<u>1,194</u>	<u>1,142</u>
Total Current Assets	38,369	35,992	32,028	13,485	12,513	13,180
Gross Property Plant & Equip	319,648	306,227	282,295	6,955	6,919	6,793
Accumulated Depreciation	<u>194,749</u>	<u>181,777</u>	<u>169,397</u>	<u>4,445</u>	<u>4,323</u>	<u>4,138</u>
Net Property Plant & Equip	124,899	124,450	112,898	2,510	2,596	2,655
Intangible Assets	1,674	1,606	250	3,337	2,617	2,326
Long Term Investments	222,067	225,278	136,655	35,540	35,667	35,738
<u>Other Assets</u>	<u>16,812</u>	<u>15,346</u>	<u>10,998</u>	<u>11,094</u>	<u>10,455</u>	<u>9,360</u>
Total Assets	<u>\$403,821</u>	<u>\$402,672</u>	<u>\$292,829</u>	<u>\$65,966</u>	<u>\$63,848</u>	<u>\$63,259</u>
<u>Liabilities</u>						
Accounts Payable	25,021	24,003	18,186	3,052	3,075	3,125
Accrued Expenses	11,204	11,495	8,935	3,364	3,401	3,660
Current Debt	9,832	7,636	6,056	1,947	198	1,118
<u>Other Current Liabilities</u>	<u>4,519</u>	<u>4,682</u>	<u>4,105</u>	<u>1,340</u>	<u>1,328</u>	<u>1,301</u>
Total Current Liabilities	50,576	47,816	37,282	9,703	8,002	9,204
LT Debt & Leases	113,681	118,515	76,011	22,392	23,594	21,376
Pensions & OPEB	33,578	34,262	37,079	954	908	928
Deferred LT Liabilities	60,128	56,181	37,544	3,164	2,806	2,519
Minority Interests				31	29	0
<u>Other Liabilities</u>	<u>22,723</u>	<u>23,227</u>	<u>18,543</u>	<u>5,387</u>	<u>4,890</u>	<u>4,756</u>
Total Liabilities	\$280,686	\$280,001	\$206,459	\$41,631	\$40,229	\$38,783
<u>Shareholders' Equity</u>						
Common Share Capital	6,495	6,495	6,495	17	17	17
Additional Paid-In Capital	89,604	89,763	91,108	146,780	148,041	149,282
Retained Earnings	39,695	39,005	35,796	-74,965	-78,827	-82,378

Other Equity	<u>-12,659</u>	<u>-12,592</u>	<u>-47,029</u>	<u>-47,497</u>	<u>-45,612</u>	<u>-42,445</u>
Total Equity	123,135	122,671	86,370	24,335	23,619	24,476
Total Liabilities & Equity	<u>\$403,821</u>	<u>\$402,672</u>	<u>\$292,829</u>	<u>\$65,966</u>	<u>\$63,848</u>	<u>\$63,259</u>

Source: Morningstar Online, 2017

Annual Balance Sheets (all number in millions)

Fiscal Year Ending	AT&T			Time Warner		
	12/31/16	12/31/15	12/31/14	3/31/16	3/31/15	3/31/14
<u>Operating Activities</u>						
Net Income	\$13,333	\$13,687	\$6,518	\$3,925	\$3,832	\$3,827
Adj.from Inc to Cash	31,447	25,439	29,507	10,739	9,338	9,235
Change in Working Capital	(3,022)	(1,768)	(1,761)	(9,344)	(8,838)	(7,600)
Other Operating Cash Flows	<u>(2,414)</u>	<u>(1,478)</u>	<u>(2,926)</u>	<u>(637)</u>	<u>(481)</u>	<u>(1,781)</u>
Cash Flow from Operations	\$39,344	\$35,880	\$31,338	\$4,683	\$3,851	\$3,681
<u>Investing Activities</u>						
Purchase/Pty Plant & Equip	(22,408)	(20,015)	(21,433)	(432)	(423)	(474)
Sale(Purchase) of Invest.				(9)	(39)	(5)
Proceeds/Pty Plant & Equip	(2,313)	(30,676)	4,982	0	0	2,664
Other Investing Cash Flows	<u>506</u>	<u>1,547</u>	<u>(1,886)</u>	<u>(919)</u>	<u>(531)</u>	<u>(802)</u>
Cash Flow from Investing	(\$24,215)	(\$49,144)	(\$18,337)	(\$1,360)	(\$993)	\$1,383
<u>Financing Activities</u>						
Change in Debt	(683)	23,926	5,617	512	1,413	2,326
Change in Equity	(366)	(126)	(1,578)	(2,062)	(3,316)	(4,987)
Payment of Dividends	(11,797)	(10,200)	(9,552)	(1,269)	(1,150)	(1,109)
Other Financing Cash Flows	<u>(1,616)</u>	<u>(3,818)</u>	<u>(2,224)</u>	<u>(1,103)</u>	<u>(260)</u>	<u>(173)</u>
Cash Flow from Financing	(\$14,462)	\$9,782	(\$7,737)	(\$3,922)	(\$3,313)	(\$3,943)
				(17)	(8)	(190)
<u>Net Increase/Decrease in Cash</u>						
Change in Cash	667	(3,482)	5,264	(616)	(463)	802
Opening Cash	<u>5,121</u>	<u>8,603</u>	<u>3,339</u>	<u>2,155</u>	<u>2,618</u>	<u>1,816</u>
Closing Cash	<u>5,788</u>	<u>5,121</u>	<u>8,603</u>	<u>1,539</u>	<u>2,155</u>	<u>2,618</u>
<u>Supplemental Information</u>						
Depreciation & Amor. (CF)	\$25,847	\$22,016	\$18,273	\$8,993	\$8,711	\$8,773
Net Purch/ Pty Plant & Equip	(\$22,408)	(\$20,015)	(\$21,433)	(\$432)	(\$423)	(\$474)

Source: Morningstar Online, 2017